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NOTES
Limitation Tolling When Class Status Denied: Chardon
v. Fumero Soto and Alice in Wonderland
In 1974 the Supreme Court, in American Pipe & Construction Co.
v. Utah,1 held that the filing of a class action under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 tolled the statute of limitations for claims based
upon violations of the Clayton Act. 2 The Court further held that
the statute would remain tolled during the pendency of the class
action, and, upon the trial court's denial of the class status of the
action, unnamed class members would be permitted to intervene as
plaintiffs during the remainder of the limitations period unexpired
at the time the class action was filed. Courts initially viewed Ameri-
can Pipe as holding that the filing of a Rule 23 class action sus-
pended the running of the statute of limitations. But nine years
later in Chardon v. Fumero Soto,3 originally a Rule 23 class action al-
leging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme Court limited
the American Pipe rule. According to the Chardon Court, American
Pipe only held that the filing of the class action tolled the statute of
limitations and no more. 4 The broadly applied uniform rule of
American Pipe was restricted to its tolling application. For the effect of
the tolling, whether the limitations period is suspended only, ex-
tended, or renewed,5 courts must often look to related or analo-
gous federal or state statutes. 6
To appreciate the effect of Chardon, a review of limitations con-
cepts and class action procedures will be helpful. Part I of this note
discusses the policy concerns common to statutes of limitation and
their tolling rules. Part I also discusses various tolling effects avail-
able to carry out those policies. Further, because this note focuses
on the relationship between statutes of limitation and the class ac-
tion device, Part II briefly examines the procedural aspects of class
actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Part
III focuses on the Court's reasoning in American Pipe & Construction
Co. v. Utah and Chardon v. Fumero Soto and the latter's reliance on
1 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
2 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982).
3 103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983).
4 The court of appeals concluded that the statute of limitations was tolled as to un-
named class members by the filing of the class action in accordance with American Pipe and
this ruling was not contested on appeal. Id. at 2615. As to the tolling effect, however, the
Court found that American Pipe did not supply the answer. Id. at 2618.
5 See text accompanying notes 23-30 infra.
6 See text accompanying notes 103-15 infra.
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New York Board of Regents v. Tomanio,7 a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in
which the Supreme Court instructed federal courts to look to state
statutes when that federal law provides no appropriate rule. Fi-
nally, Part IV discusses the impact of Chardon, particularly in light of
Justice Rehnquist's dissent. This note concludes that the Court im-
properly narrowed the scope of American Pipe's interpretation of
Rule 23 and expanded the potential for confusion in class action
litigation.
I. Statutes of Limitation: Policy Considerations
and Tolling Effects
A. Statutes of Limitation
Statutes of limitation,8 by placing time constraints on the initia-
tion of an action, seek to "promote justice by preventing surprise
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared."9 Furthermore, statutes of limitation promote
stability for potential defendants because they codify society's belief
that individuals should be afforded repose-that is, they should not
be forced to live indefinitely with the threat of a lawsuit.' 0 These
limitations not only permit an individual defendant to plan his daily
affairs but, since threats of lawsuits may have an economic impact
on a wide range of persons apart from the potential defendant,
such limitations help alleviate the disruptive effects of uncertainty
in commercial activities."
In addition, requiring claimants to file timely lawsuits and dis-
missing untimely suits serves.a number of administrative goals. For
example, limitation statutes help conserve judicial resources by al-
leviating burdens on overcrowded court dockets,12 and allow courts
7 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
8 Statutes of limitation define the "limited period of time. . . for the bringing of an
action and, if the action is not commenced in time, the lapse of time will constitute a de-
fense to the suit or will deprive the plaintiff of his right." W. FERGUSON, STATUTES OF LIMI-
TATION SAVING STATUTES 1 (1980).
9 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944).
Even though a litigant may have a valid claim, a statute of limitation will bar that claim
because the law deems it unjust not to put the adversary on timely notice that he will be
called on to defend against the claim. Id. at 348-49. Thus, in time, "the right to be free of
stale claims . . . comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." Id.
10 Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 341 (1805); Note, Limitation Borrowing in
Federal Courts, 77 MIcH. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1979).
11 Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
12 Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and
State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1016 (1980).
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to concentrate on relatively current disputes' 3 in which evidence is
fresh and witnesses are available. Statutes of limitation also reflect
society's view that some actions are worthier than others. By af-
fording longer or shorter limitation periods, statutes of limitation
give effect to "social attitudes . . . that express favor or disfavor
toward certain classes of claims or parties."' 4 Different statutory
periods and tolling rules therefore govern torts, frauds, contracts,
real property actions, minors, incompetents, members of the armed
forces, and other categories of actions and parties. 15
B. Tolling Rules
Tolling rules, conversely, reflect the courts' and legislatures'
recognition that under certain circumstances, a plaintiff's right to
sue may predominate over the risk that a stale claim will be prose-
cuted after a defendant reasonably believes his liability has
ceased.16 For example, circumstances beyond a plaintiff's control
may prevent him from filing suit during the limitation period.' 7 In
such a case, a plaintiff's interest in a reasonable opportunity to vin-
dicate his rights outweighs the policy of repose protecting defend-
ants.' 8 This policy choice instills public confidence in the judicial
system and bolsters its credibility by permitting an injured party to
pursue his legal remedies.' 9 Tolling may appropriately apply
where the plaintiff is under a disability, where the defendant's acts
justify the tolling, or where the policy underlying the statute of limi-
tations has been met.20
13 Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424,428 (1965); Ester, Borrowing Statutes of
Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33, 36 (1962).
14 Leflar, The New Conflicts-Limitations Act, 35 MERCER L. REV. 461, 471 (1984).
15 See Leflar, supra note 14, at 471; Special Project, supra note 12, at 1084-85.
16 See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Special Project, supra
note 12, at 1084.
17 Such circumstances may include the incompetency or incarceration of the plaintiff,
his inability to get personal jurisdiction over the defendant, or concealment of the fraudu-
lent conduct attributable to the plaintiff's injury. See Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 941-
42 (7th Cir. 1972) (applying Illinois tolling period during incarceration to § 1983 claim),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972); Jolivet v. Elkins, 386 F. Supp. 261, 272 (D. Ind. 1974)
(statute of limitation tolled during defendant's absence from forum state); McDonald v.
Boslow, 363 F. Supp. 493, 498 (D. Md. 1973) (applying state law tolling period during
parties' incompetence to § 1983 claim); Special Project, supra note 12, at 1184.
18 Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 ("[the] policy of repose, designed to protect defendants, is
frequently outweighed . ..where the interests ofjustice require vindication of plaintiff's
rights.").
19 Special Project, supra note 12, at 1085.
20 See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1220-32. Three broad areas exist
in which tolling may apply. If the plaintiff is under a disability-for example, a minor, in-
competent or prisoner-his disability should not prevent him from submitting his claim for
adjudication. Second, acts on the part of the defendant may justify tolling of the statute of
limitation. For example, the defendant may depart from the jurisdiction and be beyond the
reach of process. In such case it is unfair to deny the plaintiff the right to prosecute his
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Generally, once the statute has been tolled, the commence-
ment of the tolling and its duration are measured by the term of the
plaintiff's inability to initiate suit.2 1 Thus, tolling should cease
when a plaintiff knows or should know of the fraud or tort commit-
ted against him, when the plaintiff attains majority or his disability
is removed, or the defendant returns to the jurisdiction.
C. Available Tolling Effects
Once the tolling has ceased, a question still remains as to the
effect of the tolling, that is, the "method of calculating the amount
of time available to file suit after tolling has ended." 22 Three gen-
eral tolling effects are possible: 1) suspension, 2) extension, and 3)
renewal or revival. Under suspension,23 the plaintiff must file suit
within the amount of time left in the limitation period on the day
tolling took place.24 For example, if a defendant commits a tort
which normally has a two year limitations period and the defendant
a year later absconds to Brazil for three years, the plaintiff still has
one year to file suit if the defendant returns to the jurisdiction. The
suspension rule promotes stability and certainty because all parties
know when an action must be filed and when repose may be
enjoyed.
Second, the limitation period may be extended. The extension
rule establishes fixed periods during which the plaintiff may file suit
without regard to the length of the original limitation period or the
action since the plaintiff has not "slept on his rights" but has been thwarted in pursuing his
claim by an act of the defendant. This same policy governs when a defendant has concealed
the plaintiff's harm or has acknowledged the underlying debt and led the plaintiff to believe
that suit was unnecessary. And finally, tolling may be required when the purposes underly-
ing the statute of limitation have been" met, so that the plaintiff should not thereafter be
barred from pursuing his claim. For example, if a defendant had been adequately notified
of the extent and nature of the plaintiffs claim, usually through a previous lawsuit, he
should be estopped from asserting the defense of the statute of limitations out of fairness to
the plaintiff.
21 Id
22 Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611, 2613 n.l (1983).
23 Suspension generally occurs because of one of the following: fraudulent conceal-
ment, estoppel, waiver, absence of the defendant from the jurisdiction, disability of the
plaintiff including infancy, insanity, imprisonment, or death of either party. Note, supra
note 10, at 1144 n.l11.
24 If only a short time remained on the limitation period when tolling occurred, a hard-
ship may be imposed on the plaintiff. For instance, in American Pipe, only 11 days remained
on the limitation period. In order to preserve his right of action, the unnamed class mem-
ber must have learned of denial of class certification, evaluated the prospect of recovery,
and taken the appropriate action. With little time for evaluation, the plaintiff is compelled
to move to intervene, the result being the multiplicity of intervention motions which the
Supreme Court condemned in American Pipe. Note, Class Actions and Statutes of Limitations, 48
U. CHI. L. REv. 106, 118 (1981). Suspension may adversely affect defendants as well when,
as in American Pipe, suspension continues for many years. Id. at 118-19.
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amount of time left when the tolling began. 25 "Savings statutes"
are a common device used to implement a state's decision to afford
this additional period of time.26 The Kentucky savings statute27 il-
lustrates the operation of the extension rule. Under that statute, if
the plaintiffs action is timely filed but dismissed because the court
lacks jurisdiction, the plaintiff may commence a new action in the
proper court within ninety days from the dismissal. Because the
defendant has been afforded notice during the original statutory
period, the underlying policies of the statute of limitation are
deemed satisfied. Thus, policies of fairness to the plaintiff, preser-
vation of judicial system credibility, and avoidance of rigid rules
prevail.28
Third, tolling may renew or revive the limitation period, giving
the plaintiff the benefit of an entirely fresh time period. 29 Typically,
a defendant's affirmative act during or even after the running of the
limitation period is necessary to trigger renewal.30
II. Class Actions
A plaintiff class action is a suit brought by one or more mem-
bers of a group or class on behalf of all members of that group or
class who have suffered injury from the alleged wrong of the de-
fendant. 31 The purpose of the class suit is to adjudicate common
disputes in one action where it is not feasible to join all members of
the class as named parties. 32
25 See W. FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 55-56.
26 Savings statutes generally provide that "when an action is timely brought and dis-
missed other than on the merits, a new action may be commenced within a designated
period following the dismissal." Id. In Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 109 N.E.
594 (1915), Judge Cardozo emphasized that in interpreting savings statutes timely notice to
the defendant as well as diligence of the plaintiff must be considered:
The statute is designed to insure to the diligent suitor the right to a hearing in
court till he reaches ajudgment on the merits. Its broad and liberal purpose is not
to be frittered away by any narrow construction. The important consideration is
that, by invoking judicial aid, a litigant gives timely notice to his adversary of a
present purpose to maintain his rights before the courts.
Id. at 539, 109 N.E. at 596. Other courts have also looked at both timely notice to the
defendant and the diligence of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Lamson v. Hutchings, 118 F. 321 (7th
Cir. 1902).
27 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.270 (Baldwin 1981).
28 See generally W. FERGUSON, supra note 8.
29 See Special Project, supra note 12, at 1085 n.342.
30 Id.
31 See 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 561, at 254 (rev.
ed. Wright 1961); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
32 See Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 185-86 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (commenting on the value of the class action litigation). In addition, class actions are a
recognized supplement to law enforcement, the plaintiff serving as a private attorney gen-
eral. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (class actions provide a corporate
therapeutic which is essential to effective law enforcement). Critics of the procedure, how-
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requires that the court de-
termine "as soon as practicable after the commencement of an ac-
tion" whether it may be maintained as a class action.33 The class
certification process, however, may take many months or even
years;3 4 accordingly, the limitations period applicable to the cause
of action may expire during the certification process.
In certifying a class under Rule 23, the court must determine
that the prerequisites of 23(a) and the elements of 23(b) have been
fulfilled.3 5 Also, 23(c) requires that unnamed class members in
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions be afforded the opportunity to "opt out"
of the class.3 6 The judgment rendered, whether favorable or not,
will be binding on those class members who choose not to be
excluded.3 7
If the court determines that the action should not proceed as a
class action, an individual class member may move to intervene
under Rule 24.38 Or, the claimant may file an individual action
ever, have labelled it a form of legalized blackmail, and it has been dubbed a "Frankenstein
Monster." ChiefJudge Lumbard of the Second Circuit first used the term "Frankenstein
Monster" in Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 491 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, CJ.,
dissenting) to describe the case but it has been applied generally to class actions. See, e.g.,
San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.R.D. 435,436 (W.D. Tex. 1975); see
also Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 203
(1976).
33 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
34 See Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1141-43
(1974), cited in Note, Class Actions and Statutes of Limitations, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 106 (1981). See
also Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1977) (class suit pending for two years before
denial of class certification), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
35 Class actions in federal courts are permitted under Rule 23(a) when the following
conditions are met: (1) the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impractical;
(2) there are law or fact questions common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of those of the class; and (4) the representative parties will
protect the interests of the class. Rule 23(b) establishes additional requirements for deter-
mination by the court whether the class action is appropriate under varying circumstances.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
36 Rule 23(c) provides in pertinent part as follows:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reason-
able effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude
him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether
favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
37 The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(1) or
(b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the
court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class
action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed,
and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the
class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
38 Rule 24(a) allows intervention as of right when a federal statute confers an uncondi-
tional right to intervene or when the outcome may impair or impede the applicant's ability
19851
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when intervention has been denied, when the class action forum is
inconvenient, or when he wishes to control his own litigation.3 9
The present rule extends the resjudicata effect of a class action
judgment, whether favorable or unfavorable, to all identifiable class
members.40 Equity requires, therefore, that all class members be
protected by the tolling of the statute of limitations.41 Filing the
class action tolls the limitations period as to all asserted members
of the class.42 The effect of that tolling for class members who
choose to be excluded from the class action or for those eliminated
upon denial of class certification, however, raises other questions.
III. The Uniform Rule of Suspension
The issue presented upon denial of certification 43 is whether
to protect his interest in the property or transaction. Rule 24(b) provides permissive inter-
vention in two situations at the discretion of the district court, namely, when a federal stat-
ute confers a conditional right to intervene or when the applicant's claim or defense and the
main action have a question of law or fact in common. Intervention may be denied when it
will "unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties." FED.
R. Civ. P. 24(b).
39 See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
40 Prior to the extensive amendment of Rule 23 in 1966 there were no procedural
means for determining before final judgment which of the putative members of the class
would be bound by the judgment. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 546. See also 3BJ. MOORE &J.
KENNEDY, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.10[1], at 23-2603 (2d ed. 1985). When a class
action had been filed, an unnamed member of the class could wait and observe the develop-
ment of the case or even await the judgment. Id If the trial or thejudgment indicated or
reached an adverse result, the class member could choose not to intervene or join as a party
and thereby not be bound by the finaljudgment. This potential for abuse attracted consid-
erable criticism. Critics maintained that it was unfair to allow members of a class to benefit
from a favorable judgment without being bound by an unfavorable one. American Pipe, 414
U.S. at 547; BARRON & HoLTzoFF, supra note 31, § 568. Cf Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.
v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 810 (1962). These class actions
were deemed mere "invitations tojoinder" allowing "one-way intervention." 3B MOORE &
KENNEDY, supra, T 23.10[1], at 23-2603. The courts reached varying results in cases where
class members, after expiration of the limitations periods, sought intervention orjoinder in
class actions commenced before the statute had run. A majority of the federal courts ad-
dressing the issue concluded that intervention was proper because of the representative
nature of the suit. See American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 549. Other courts stressed the individual
nature of the joinder or interventioh and required each individual to satisfy the limitation
period. Id. at 549-50. The Supreme Court decisions never resolved this confusion. Id. at
550. Rule 23, however, was extensively rewritten to achieve that purpose. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 23 advisory commitee note.
41 The statute of limitations must not have run on the absentee member's claim prior to
filing of the class action. Comment, Class Actions Under New Rule 23 and Federal Statutes of
Limitation: A Study of Conflicting Rationale, 13 VILL. L. REV. 370, 373 (1968). Class members
whose claims are barred when the class action was instituted will be excluded from the
class. Coppotelli v. Howlett, 76 F.R.D. 20 (E.D. Ill. 1977). Marshall v. Electric Hose &
Rubber Co., 68 F.R.D. 287 (D. Del. 1975).
42 Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353 (1983); American Pipe, 414 U.S.
at 553.
43 Although the action is "stripped of its character as a class action" on denial of certifi-
cation, the case is not thereafter treated as if there never was a class action. United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 393 (1977).
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the limitation period governing the unnamed members' claims
ought to be suspended only, extended, or entirely renewed.44
From 1974 when the Supreme Court decided American Pipe & Con-
struction Co. v. Utah until the Court's 1983 decision, Chardon v.
Fumero Soto, the courts applied American Pipe's suspension only
rule.45 Under that rule, unnamed members were allowed to seek
intervention or file individual actions for a period not to exceed the
time remaining on the original limitation period on the day the
class action was filed.
A. American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah
In American Pipe46 the Supreme Court held that the original fil-
ing of a class action suspends the statute of limitations on behalf of
all asserted members of the class who make timely motions to inter-
vene after denial of class certification. 47 Because American Pipe was
the first definitive ruling concerning application of the new Rule
2348 and the subsequent tolling effect on the statute of limitations
as to unnamed class members, a close examination of the facts and
holding is warranted.
In American Pipe the State of Utah, on behalf of itself and vari-
ous state and local agencies, brought a class action 49 against Ameri-
can Pipe for antitrust violations under the Clayton Act.50 The court
denied class certification for lack of numerosity. 51 Eight days later,
44 See notes 22-30 supra and accompanying text.
45 Courts have applied the American Pipe suspension rule to a wide variety of federal
causes of action, regardless of whether the federal statute supplied the limitations period or
whether it was borrowed from state statutes. See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker,
462 U.S. 345 (1983) (Title VII action); United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385
(1977) (Title VII action); Pavlak v. Church, 727 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1984) (§ 1983 action);
Wood v. Combustion Eng'g, 643 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981) (securities act case); Appleton
Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 635 F.2d 603, (7th Cir. 1980) (ICC rate refund en-
forcement), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981); Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1977)
(securities acts case), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 724, (2d
Cir. 1977) (securities acts case); Haas v. Pittsburg Nat'l Bank, 526 F.2d 1003 (3d Cir. 1975)
(state and federal banking statutes).
46 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
47 Id. at 552-53.
48 For discussion of case law prior to the 1966 amendment of Rule 23, see Comment,
supra note 41, at 375-80.
49 The state of Utah purported to represent "public bodies and agencies of the state
and local government in the state of Washington who are end users of pipe acquired from
the defendants" as well as states in the "Western Area" which had not previously filed suit.
American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 541.
50 The complaint alleged violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982),
claiming that petitioners had conspired to rig prices in the sale of concrete and steel pipe.
414 U.S. at 541.
51 Although the purported class exceeded 800 members, the district judge, based on
previous experience, concluded that those entities which would be able to show injury
would be far lower and thatjoinder was not impracticable, so that the requirements of Rule
23(a)(1) had not been met. The districtjudge found that Utah's suit, but for lack of numer-
1985]
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over sixty purported class members sought to intervene; the district
court denied intervention on the ground that the limitation period
under section 4B of the Clayton Act 52 had not been tolled by Utah's
filing of the class action.53 The basic limitations period under the
Clayton Act is four years except when the United States commences
any proceeding to restrain antitrust violations. During the pen-
dency of the government suit and for one year thereafter the statute
of limitations is suspended as to related private actions. 54 Because
the class action was filed eleven days before the one year anniver-
sary of the consent judgment in the government suit, intervention
would have been timely if the Clayton Act's one year limitations
period 55 had been suspended for the interval between filing of the
class action and the order denying certification. 56
The Supreme Court held that the commencement of the class
action suspended the applicable statute of limitations for all as-
serted class members who would have been parties had the class
been certified. Furthermore, the limitations period continued to be
suspended during the class certification process. 57
American Pipe is an equitable interpretation of Rule 23.58 Ameri-
osity, was otherwise certifiable as a class action, all the other prerequisites for a class action
having been fulfilled. 414 U.S. at 543.
52 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982). Section 4B provides in part: "Any action to enforce any
cause of action [under the antitrust laws] shall be forever barred unless commenced within
four years after the cause of action accrued."
53 414 U.S. at 544.
54 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1982).
55 When the government institutes a civil or criminal proceeding, the limitations period
is extended one year after the government proceedings are terminated. It was this one year
limitation that was at issue in lAmerican Pipe. The wrongful acts occurred prior to June 23,
1964, when the government proceeding was commenced. The government litigation ter-
minated May 24, 1968, so the plaintiffs had one year thereafter to file suit. 414 U.S. at 540.
56 The original class action was filed 11 days short of a year after the conclusion of
government litigation, namely, on May 13, 1969. On December 4, 1969, the order denying
class status was entered. Eight days later, the respondents filed motions to intervene as
plaintiffs under Rules 24(a)(2) and 24(b)(2). Three days remained on the one year limita-
tion period if suspension applied.
57 414 U.S. at 551-52.
58 Although the majority in Chardon read American Pipe as an interpretation of the Clay-
ton Act, the Court in American Pipe repeatedly stressed that its decision was an interpretation
of Rule 23: "This case involves an aspect of the relationship between a statute of limitation
and the provisions of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 regulating class actions in the federal courts."
414 U.S. at 540. Part I of the opinion discussed the history of Rule 23. Id. at 545-52. The
Court found the suspension rule to be the rule "most consistent with federal class action
procedure." Id. at 554-55. The Court believed that "this interpretation of the Rule is . ..
necessary to insure effectuation of the purposes of litigative efficiency and economy that the
Rule in its present form was designed to serve." Id. at 555-56. Finally, discussing the pre-
cise effect of the filing of the class action on the limitations period, the Court noted that
under the Clayton Act, commencement of a government suit suspended the statute of limi-
tations. It found that "[tihe same concept leads to the conclusion that the commencement
of the class action in this case suspended the running of the limitation period only during
[Vol. 60:686
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can Pipe59 held "that the commencement of a class action suspends
the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of
the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted
to continue as a class action." 60 The Court found that "[a] contrary
rule allowing participation only by those potential members of the
class who had earlier filed motions to intervene in the suit would
deprive Rule 23 class actions of the efficiency and economy of liti-
gation which is the principal purpose of [that] procedure."6 1 Ar-
guably, American Pipe established a federal rule applicable to all Rule
23 class actions involving federal claims: as to identical claims, the
running of the limitations statute is suspended during the pendency
of the class action.
B. Chardon v. Fumero Soto
In Chardon,62 the plaintiffs held nontenured supervisory posi-
tions in the Puerto Rico public school system. Beginning in June of
1977, the claimants were demoted because of their political affilia-
tions.63 Just short of a year after the wrongful demotions, a Rule 23
class action was filed on their behalf alleging a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 contains no express statute of limita-
tion but is subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 which reads in part:
[The federal civil rights statutes] shall be exercised and en-
forced in conformity with the laws of the United States so far as
such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect, but in all cases
where they are not adapted to the object or are deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish of-
fenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by
the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court hav-
ing jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held . . . shall
be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and dispo-
the pendency of the motion to strip the suit of its class action character." Id. at 561. See also
Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611, 2620 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting):
Despite the silence of the Clayton Act, the Court concluded that § 4B had
been tolled. Since the Clayton Act plainly did not address the question before it,
and since the Court made no reference at all to state law, the source of the tolling
rule applied by the Court was necessarily Rule 23.
(emphasis in original). See also Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and
remanded in light of Chardon, 103 S. Ct. 3529 (1983) ("Although American Pipe concerned a
cause of action under the federal antitrust laws, this was in our view an accidental feature of
the case; the rule of tolling adopted there was an equitable incident of federal procedure.")
59 The Supreme Court's language left no doubt that it was establishing a rule applica-
ble to Rule 23 class actions generally: "We are convinced that the rule most consistent with
federal class action procedure must be that the commencement of a class action suspends
the applicable statute of limitations." American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 553.
62 103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983).
63 Id. at 2613.
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sition of the cause .... 64
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit deter-
mined that section 1988 required use of Puerto Rico law for the
limitation period, the tolling rule, and the effect of tolling. Accord-
ingly, the court of appeals applied the one year limitation period
specified in the Puerto Rico Code65 and the Puerto Rico tolling rule
requiring that the limitations period is tolled when an action is in-
stituted in court.66 Finally, the court of appeals examined Puerto
Rico law to determine the effect of tolling.67 Under Puerto Rico
case law, if an action is discontinued, the limitation period begins to
run anew from discontinuance. 68 Thus, if an action is commenced
one day before the limitation period expires and later discontinued
without prejudice, the plaintiff has the full limitation period in
which to refile the case.
In Chardon the original class action was commenced June 19,
1978.69 The trial court denied class certification 70 sixty-three days
after the filing. Thirty-seven plaintiffs then filed their individual
suits under section 1983 on January 10, 1979, or later. All individ-
ual suits were filed more than one year plus sixty-three days after
the actions accrued. Subtracting the sixty-three days extension for
the decertification process, every suit was filed more than one year
after the violation and too late if the American Pipe suspension rule
applied.7 1 The court of appeals recognized that in American Pipe the
Supreme Court had interpreted Rule 23 to permit tolling of a fed-
eral statute of limitation upon filing of a class action.72 It also
found that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court would hold that the stat-
ute of limitation was so tolled. 78 The court of appeals, however, did
64 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (emphasis added). The Respondents argued that "laws of
the United States" refers to federal statutory law, so that if "American Pipe's tolling rule of
suspension. . . is a judicial tolling rule" Puerto Rico law governs since ajudicial tolling rule
is not a "law of the United States." Brief of Respondents at 5, Chardon v. Fumero Soto,
103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983).
65 See Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611, 2615 (1983). The parties agreed that
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 5298(2) (1968) supplied the limitations period. Id.
66 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 5303 (1968) provides: "Prescription of actions is inter-
rupted by their institution before the courts .
67 Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2615.
68 When tolling ceases the plaintiff benefits from the full length of the limitations pe-
riod. Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2615 (citing Feliciano v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth.,
93 P.R. 638, 644 (1966); Heirs of Gorbea v. Portilla, 46 P.R. 279, 284 (1934)). These cases
did not involve class actions. 103 S. Ct. at 2615.
69 Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2614.
70 Id. Certification was denied because membership of the class was not so numerous
that joinder was impracticable, as required by Rule 23(a)(1). Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 2615.
73 The court of appeals noted that although the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico had not
ruled on the question whether a class action would toll the statute for unnamed plaintiffs'
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not apply the American Pipe suspension rule.74 Rather, it borrowed
from Puerto Rico case law and found that the full one year limita-
tion period commenced anew upon denial of certification. 75 Ac-
cording to the court, the individual plaintiffs had one year from
August 21, 1978 to file their individual complaints, although at
least in one case the plaintiffs cause of action had accrued 364 days
before the filing of the class action and actually 469 days or more
before the filing of the individual complaint in January of 1979.76
The defendants in Chardon argued that the court of appeals'
application of the Puerto Rico renewal rule violated the Court's de-
cision in American Pipe. According to the defendants, American Pipe
established a federal rule requiring suspension whenever a federal
class action is discontinued.77 Justice Stevens, however, writing for
the majority, found that such an argument read "more into [the]
decision in American Pipe than the Court actually decided" and failed
"to give full effect to Tomanio."78 The Supreme Court affirmed the
court of appeals' decision, holding that under section 1988 courts
are required to apply state law, including state law on the effect of
tolling, in the absence of applicable federal law.79
identical claims, Puerto Rico had modeled its class action procedures after the federal prac-
tice. Id.
74 The court of appeals departed from the American Pipe rule and found that Puerto Rico
law applied as to the length of the statute of limitations, whether the period would be tolled
during the class action suit, and as to the effect of the tolling. Id.
75 Id. at 2614-15. Under the Puerto Rico statute, see note 98 infra, the filing of an action
in court tolls the statute as to that party's identical causes of action. See id. at 2615.
76 Brief of Petitioners at 10-11, Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983).
77 103 S. Ct. at 2615-16. Petitioners argued that "in American Pipe this Court estab-
lished a uniform federal procedural rule applicable to class actions brought in the federal
courts, and it has consistently been so interpreted and applied." Brief of Petitioners at 13,
Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983).
78 103 S. Ct. at 2616. Under New York Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478
(1980), federal courts are to apply state statutes of limitation as well as state tolling rules.
Id. See text accompanying notes 80-86.
79 The Court recognized that its decision would cause problems but contended that
modifying the law is a legislative function, noting:
Until Congress enacts a federal statute of limitations to govern § 1983 litigation,
comparable to the statute it ultimately enacted to solve the analogous problems
presented by borrowing state law in federal antitrust litigation, federal courts must
continue the practice of "limitations borrowing" outlined in Tomanio.
103 S. Ct. at 2619. But see Wilson v. Garcia, No. 83-2146 (Supreme Court Apr. 17, 1985)
(available Apr. 26, 1985, WESTLAW, Genfed library, Supreme Court database) (character-
izing all § 1983 actions as personal injury actions as a matter of federal law). In this § 1983
action the Court construed § 1988 as "a directive to select, in each State, the one most
appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims" rather than to apply the statute of
limitations from the most closely analogous state statute on a case by case basis. Justice
O'Connor, dissenting, pointed out that the Court, in legislating uniformity, despite Con-
gress' recent rejection of amending legislation, has not only "coopt[ed] federal legislation,"
but also "effectively foreclose[d] legislative creativity on the part of the States." Wilson did
not involve the question of the effect of tolling on the statute of limitations merely the ques-
tion of the length of the limitations period.
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C. Board of Regents v. Tomanio
In 1980, the Court had considered whether an earlier state
court filing tolled the statute of limitations for a subsequent section
1983 federal action. In Board of Regents v. Tomanio,80 Tomanio had
originally sued the Board of Regents of the University of the State
of New York in a state court proceeding alleging the arbitrary and
capricious refusal of her application for a chiropractic license.81
Three years after the license refusal, the New York Court of Ap-
peals denied her appeal from the adverse order on her suit.8 2
Seven months later, three years and seven months after the Board's
refusal, she filed suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that the Board's refusal violated the due process
clause under the fourteenth amendment.8 3 Although Tomanio pre-
vailed in the district court and the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court reversed. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found
that Tomanio's federal action was barred under the New York three
year statute of limitations.8 4 Codified New York tolling rules did
not extend the time for filing an action while the claimant pursued
another related but independent action. The Court therefore
found that Tomanio's state court action had not tolled the statute
for her federal action.8 5
The Court in Tomanio necessarily referred to state law for the
limitations period and tolling rule. Neither section 1988 nor any
comparable civil rights statute contains a limitations period or toll-
ing rule. Thus under the mandate of section 1988, the Court ap-
plied New York's limitations and tolling rules.8 6
80 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
81 After failing the special examinations for a New York chiropractic license on seven
separate occasions between 1964 and 1971, she applied to the New York Board of Regents
for a waiver of the examination requirement. The Board thereafter notified her of its deci-
sion to deny her application. Although the Board did not grant her an evidentiary hearing
or give a statement of its reasons she did not raise the constitutional challenge in the state
court proceeding. Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 482.
84 Id. at 492.
85 The Court stated:
Here New York has expressed by statute its disfavor of tolling its statute of limita-
tions for one action while an independent action is being pursued. Considerations
of federalism are quite appropriate in adjudicating federal suits based on 42
U.S.C. § 1983... . But the Court of Appeals' rule allowing tolling can scarcely
be deemed a triumph of federalism when it necessitates a rejection of the rule
actually chosen by the New York Legislature."
Id.
86 446 U.S. at 486. The New York statute did not contain a provision tolling the statute
of limitation during the pendency of a related, but independent, case.
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D. Comparison of the Cases
The petitioners in Chardon contended that the respondents'
claims which were filed more than one year after the claims accrued
were barred by the statute of limitations, because the statute of lim-
itations was merely suspended during the pendency of the class ac-
tion in accordance with the American Pipe rule. Respondents,
however, relying on Tomanio, urged that because no federal statute
of limitations applied to the section 1983 claims, Puerto Rico's stat-
ute of limitations and tolling rules applied. The issue before the
Supreme Court in Chardon, therefore, was whether any federal law
was "adapted to the purposes of the civil rights laws," within the
meaning of section 1988. The majority and dissenters disagreed as
to whether the "rule" of American Pipe constituted federal law. The
Chardon majority narrowly interpreted American Pipe to apply only to
Clayton Act cases and other cases in which a federal statute con-
tains a suspension provision.8 7 Therefore, according to the major-
ity, the American Pipe suspension rule was not federal law adaptable
to section 1983.
The dissenters believed that, while the majority's reading was
plausible, American Pipe should be more broadly interpreted as es-
tablishing a uniform rule which applied to all federal class actions.88
Justice Rehnquist 6oncluded that American Pipe "recognizes a fed-
eral rule of tolling applicable to class actions brought under [Rule
23], and that this rule is made applicable by § 1988 to claims
brought under § 1983."89 Because American Pipe supplied an appli-
cable federal rule, section 1988 required a "depart[ure] from the
general rule of reference to state law." 90
Justice Stevens' majority opinion relied heavily on Board of Re-
gents v. Tomanio,9 1 as did the court of appeals. 92 But Justice Rehn-
quist referred to Tomanio only once in his dissent, and then only in a
footnote where he commended the majority opinion, perhaps with
87 Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2618. See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345
(1983).
88 Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2619-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89 103 S. Ct. at 2620 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). A tolling rule was necessarily estab-
lished since the Clayton Act did not address the class action question and the Court made
no reference to state law. Not only did the Court give a "lengthy discussion of the history,
purposes, and intent of the rule," but subsequent decisions have "reflected this under-
standing." Id.
90 Id. at 2619. Rehnquist also noted that in other areas the Court "has recognized
federal tolling rules apply to state statute of limitations. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.
392 (1946) (general federal principles of equity must be applied by federal courts in actions
involving federal claims, even where state statutes of limitation are borrowed)." Id. at 2621.
91 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
92 See Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611, 2616 (1983). See also Fernandez v.
Chardon, 681 F.2d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 1982) (application of state tolling rules to § 1983 claims
is required by 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
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tongue in cheek, for recognizing that Tomanio was distinguishable
from American Pipe because Rule 23 was not involved in Tomanio.
93
American Pipe concerned an equitable tolling and its effect, an
issue not relevant in Tomanio. Tomanio established that Congress,
by enacting section 1988, "plainly instructed the federal courts to
refer to state law when federal law provides no rule of decision for
actions brought under section 1983." 9 4 However, the only com-
mon questions in Tomanio and Chardon were whether state law
should supply the applicable limitations period and whether the fil-
ing of a prior action tolled the statute of limitations. In Chardon, all
parties agreed that the Puerto Rico limitations period applied and
that the filing of the class action tolled the running of the statute.95
The issue in Chardon was the effect of the tolling, whether there
should be suspension only or renewal of the entire limitations pe-
riod, an issue not present in Tomanio. In Tomanio the prior state
action did not toll the statute of limitations applicable to the section
1983 action because the prior cause of action and the section 1983
action were substantively distinct. Certainly, the court in Tomanio
should have applied the New York limitation period which was
found to have run. It was also entitled to give weight to the New
York legislative requirement that a plaintiff either "obtain ajudicial
stay of the time for commencing an [alternative] action or to litigate
at risk." 96 But, other than borrowing the period of limitation, the
Court in Tomanio need not have applied New York law at all; that
the section 1983 action was time barred was "virtually foreor-
dained" by prior decisions of the Court.97
On the other hand, American Pipe and Chardon were structurally
identical; both were Rule 23 class actions with unnamed class mem-
bers intervening or filing individual actions after denial of certifica-
93 Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2621 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting):
The Court correctly recognizes that [Tomanio] ...is distinguishable. That
case did not involve a class action, and, thus the Court had no occasion to consider
whether Rule 23 creates a federal tolling rule, or the character of that rule. Thus,
there was "a void . . . in federal statutory law, . . . and state law was called upon
to fill the void. Owing to American Pipe and its interpretation of Rule 23, there is no
comparable void in this case, and federal law is therefore applicable.
In American Pipe had the class been certified, a decision on the merits in the class action
would have been res judicata as to the causes of action of those who in actual fact inter-
vened after decertification, assuming those intervenors would have chosen to remain in the
hypothetically certified class action. In Tomanio the decision in the state case would not
have been res judicata as to the later § 1983 action. This is because the claims asserted
were not identical. No constitutional issues were litigated in the state court proceedings.
Both the district court and the court of appeals rejected that defense. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at
482.
94 Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2616.
95 Id. at 2614-15.
96 Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 486-87.
97 Id. at 480.
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tion, both groups claiming the limitations period had been tolled
during the certification process, both claiming violations of federal
laws, both subject to one year statutes of limitation.98 There were
factual differences, however. American Pipe involved violations
under the Clayton Act, Chardon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 99 Further-
more, under the suspension rule, the American Pipe intervenors filed
within the one year limitations period, giving credit for time during
which the statute was tolled. 100 In Chardon the claimants filed more
than one year net after the limitations period commenced. 10 Also,
American Pipe involved no state law; Chardon involved a federal stat-
ute which failed to provide a limitation period, so that a state limita-
tions period applied. 10 2 The factual differences between Chardon
and American Pipe, however, are not as significant as their identities
as class actions under Rule 23.
IV. Implications of Chardon
Undoubtedly, Chardon has broader application than section
1983 cases. After Chardon, courts must determine where to find the
tolling effect on a case by case basis. When a cause of action is
based on a federal statute, the court may find some basis within that
statute for the tolling effect, as in the Clayton Act.' 0 3 But should
the federal statute fail to supply the tolling effect, there remains
only the amorphous logic of analogizing state laws, stare decisis, or
perhaps related federal statutes, 0 4 presumably none of which ap-
98 In American Pipe, although the basic limitation period was four years under 15 U.S.C.
§ 15(b), the government action was pending for four years so that § 5(b) of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 16(b), suspending the statute of limitations during the pendency of the class
action and for one year thereafter, applied. In Chardon the court of appeals borrowed the
one year period specified in P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 5298(2) (1968).
99 The Clayton Act specified the limitation period and contained a tolling effect provi-
sion to suspend the statute during pendency of government action and for one year thereaf-
ter. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contained no limitation period or tolling effect.
100 A final judgment was entered on May 24, 1968. Utah's civil action was filed on May
13, 1969, 11 days short of a year later. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 540-41.
101 The employees received written notices of demotion on June 17, 1977, and the class
suit was filed on June 19, 1978. Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2614.
102 Id. at 2615, 2619.
103 See text accompanying note 54 supra. In determining the "precise tolling effect," the
American Pipe Court noted that the institution of a government antitrust suit suspends the
statute of limitations. AsJustice Rehnquist pointed out, however, in Chardon, the Court did
not rely solely on this provision. Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2620 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The Court found in American Pipe that "[t]he same concept leads to the conclusion that the
commencement of the class action in this case suspended the running of the limitation
period only during the pendency of the motion to strip the suit of its class action charac-
ter." American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 561.
104 See, e.g., Pavlak v. Church, 727 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1984). The previous court deci-
sion was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court in Pavlak v. Church, 103 S. Ct. 3529
(1983) in light of Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983) (American Pipe rule
applies to actions in which the plaintiff commences an independent action rather than
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plies to class actions as such. At best, the application of Chardon to
limitations determinations after denial of class certification will lead
to extraordinary analytical difficulties and encourage ad hoc
rulemaking.
After Chardon, the Court's tolling rule is that American Pipe ap-
plies for thefact10 5 of the tolling. The effect of tolling during a Rule
23 class action is, after denial of class certification, no longer gov-
erned by a uniform rule. If the substantive claim is based on a fed-
eral statute that provides a tolling effect rule, 0 6 such as the Clayton
Act, that rule will control. In section 1983 actions the state law of
the forum applies so long as it is not inconsistent with section
1983.107 However, in other actions based on federal law which in-
clude no tolling effect provision, the effect of tolling during the fed-
eral class action is found only in the law of the forum or wherever
else one must seek to find the analogous law.108 As Justice Stevens
wrote:
American Pipe simply asserts a federal interest in assuring the effi-
ciency and economy of the class action procedure. After class
certification is denied, that federal interest is vindicated as long
as each unnamed plaintiff is given as much time to intervene or
file a separate action as he would have under a state savings stat-
ute applicable to a party whose action has been dismissed for
reasons unrelated to the merits, or, in the absence of a statute,
moves to intervene in the original action) and Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611
(1983). Pavlak involved an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), and the Federal Commu-
nications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982) against a telephone company for aiding an illegal
wiretap by providing equipment to the Boise police department. The court declined to
apply American Pipe to cases in which the plaintiff seeks to file an independent suit rather
than moves to intervene in the original action upon denial of class status. Because the
statute of limitations was not tolled, plaintiff's cause of action was time barred. On remand,
the Ninth Circuit borrowed the Federal Communication Act's two year statute of limita-
tions, 47 U.S.C. § 415(b) (1982), rather than Idaho's three year statute of limitations. The
court, without discussion, found that the effect of tolling the two year limitation period was
suspension rather than renewal. Pavlak, 727 F.2d at 1428-29. The Act extends the limita-
tion period for 90 days under certain circumstances. 47 U.S.C. § 415(d) (1982).
105 There was no disagreement in Chardon that the statute of limitations was tolled dur-
ing the pendency of the class action. Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2613.
106 For a list of federal statutes providing a suspension rule, see Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at
2621 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a list of statutes providing a variety of tolling
effects, see Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2618 n.13.
107 Schwartz, Tolling Time Limits in Class Actions, 190 N.Y.L.J. at 1, col. 1 (Nov. 15, 1983).
See also Wilson v. Garcia, No. 83-2146 (Supreme Court Apr. 17, 1985) (available Apr. 29,
1985, WESTLAW, Genfed library, Supreme Court database).
108 See Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2618. Where Congress is silent as to the limitation period,
it impliedly leaves to the courts the formulation of remedial details:
The implied absorption of State statutes of limitation within the interstices of the
federal enactments is a phase of fashioning remedial details where Congress has
not spoken but left matters for judicial determination within the framework of fa-
miliar legal principles. See Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-
50, 351-52.
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
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the time provided under the most closely analogous state tolling
statute.
10 9
Not all states, however, have savings statutes 1 0 or tolling stat-
utes.111 The statutes which do exist vary considerably from state to
state as to the circumstances of the dismissal and as to the fixed
period. 1 2 All states presumably have "analogous" case law. Ac-
cordingly, after a class action has been dismissed, unnamed plain-
tiffs, located in many states, will face a variety of tolling effects, the
"anomalous" results complained of by Justice Rehnquist.
Justice Stevens' solution for determining the tolling effect, that
the courts must look to "state savings statute[s] . . .or, in the
absence of a statute, . . . the most closely analogous state tolling
statute" 11 3 is an "inquiry," as Rehnquist complained, "more appro-
priate in Alice in Wonderland."' 14 Courts under Chardon faced with
the requirement of borrowing another "most closely analogous"
statute to ascertain tolling effect may even find none to borrow. 1 5
Moreover, Chardon contravenes several policy concerns under-
lying statutes of limitations. In some cases it derogates justice by
granting strangers to the original action, the unnamed plaintiffs in
the class action, the entire limitations period anew in which to file
109 Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2618.
110 See note 26 supra; see also FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 79. The Supreme Court in Bur-
nett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965), rejected application of state savings
statutes to extend the limitation period when the plaintiff's Federal Employers' Liability Act
action in the Ohio state court was dismissed for improper venue after the statute of limita-
tions had run. "The incorporation of variant state saving statutes would defeat the aim of a
federal limitation provision designed to produce national uniformity." 380 U.S. at 433.
The Supreme Court therefore held that the limitation provision was tolled until the state
court order dismissing the state action became final by the running of the time during
which an appeal could be taken or the entry of a final order on appeal. The Court also
rejected tolling the federal statute for. a "reasonable time" because of the ensuing uncer-
tainty as to when the limitation period would recommence to run. 380 U.S. at 435.
111 It is unclear to what the term "tolling statutes" actually refers in these statutes. See
note 112 infra.
112 For instance, the period is 60 days in Texas, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5539a
(Vernon 1958); one year in Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8117 (1953); and the entire
limitations period in Louisiana, LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 3462 (West Supp. 1985). Fourteen
other states have no general savings statute but do have similar statutes which provide addi-
tional time to start a new action upon reversal on appeal or arrest ofjudgment. FERGUSON,
supra note 8, at 2. These states are Alabama, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washing-
ton and Wisconsin. A few have no savings or similar statutes. Interestingly, two states have
enacted the Uniform Class Action Rule which has adopted the Rehnquist view of American
Pipe; Iowa in 1980 and North Dakota in 1977. Iowa also has a savings statute and North
Dakota appears to have a venue transfer statute but no savings statute. See, e.g., IoWA CODE
ANN. § 614.10 (West 1950); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-04-07 (1974).
113 Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2618.
114 Id. at 2622. According to Rehnquist "the inquiry would appear to be, if state law did
have a class action tolling rule, which it does not, what would state law say with respect to one
aspect of that rule's effect." Id. (emphasis added).
115 This may occur because not all states have savings statutes. See note 112 supra.
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claims that presumably would have been stale at least during the
time of the extended period that exceeded the original limitations
period. In effect, the filing of an ineffective class action exposes the
defendant to a universe of claimants beyond the presumed reason-
able time provided under the original statute of limitations. This
result was not likely considered in the enactment of the Puerto Rico
statutes and the tolling effects decisions relied on in Chardon,116
which involved only disputes between named individuals.
Chardon also denies defendants repose by extending their ex-
posure to liability for what can be twice the statutory limitations
period plus the time for determining whether certification is
proper, less one day. With respect to conservation of judicial re-
sources, certainly the uniform rule intended under the broad appli-
cation of American Pipe would have foreclosed litigation of tolling
effect disputes. Chardon opens the floodgates. By substantially ex-
tending statutory limitations periods, Chardon enables the filing of
stale claims to burden already clogged dockets.
V. Conclusion
American Pipe had been uniformly followed. 117 Its broad rule
was equitable, logical, coherent, adaptable to the purposes of the
statute of limitations, and uniformly predictable." 18 In American Pipe
the Court interpreted Rule 23 according to equitable tolling princi-
ples and suspended the running of the statute and no more. In
Chardon the Court interpreted section 1988 to mandate borrowing
both the limitation period and the effect of the tolling from analo-
116 See note 68 supra.
117 See, e.g., cases cited at note 45 supra. See also Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 103 S.
Ct. 2392 (1983), decided one week prior to Chardon v. Fumero Soto, in which the Court ap-
plied American Pipe to a class action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976). The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's finding that
the pending class action suspended the limitation period until class certification was denied.
American Pipe and Crown, Cork differed in that the former involved intervenors, while in the
latter the claimant had filed an independent action following decertification. Nonetheless,
the Court found no difference, under American Pipe, between intervention and separate
suits: the filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations " 'as to all asserted members
of the class,. . . not just intervenors.'" Crown, Cork, 462 U.S. at 350. Justice Blackmun, in
Crown, Cork, writing the unanimous decision of the Court, reiterated that in American Pipe the
Court had noted that "a tolling rule for class actions is not inconsistent with the purposes
served by statutes of limitations." Id. at 352 (emphasis added). Blackmum reaffirmed the
rule in American Pipe: "'[t]he commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute
of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the
suit been permitted to continue as a class action.' " Id. at 353-54 (quoting American Pipe,
414 U.S. at 554) (emphasis added).
118 The suspension rule, however, has been criticized as an "arbitrary and inflexible
method of tolling that has no inherent attraction other than its simplicity in application."
One author has proposed extension as a more logical and equitable method of tolling be-
cause tolling by extension can be tailored to the needs of the parties in the individual case.
Note, supra note 34, at 119.
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gous state (Puerto Rico) case law and narrowly limited the rule of
American Pipe.
No statute, either federal or state, incorporates provisions gov-
erning the tolling and tolling effect of the filing of a class action.
Many statutes provide tolling rules for reasons which often are ir-
relevant to the class action situation. To apply tolling rules and
their effects to procedures unrelated to such policies and goals is
illogical and thwarts those policies and goals. 119 Suspending the
limitations period merely maintains the matter until the court de-
termines whether the class action should proceed. The purposes of
the statute of limitations, encouraging the plaintiff to file a timely
action and affording the defendant repose, are best served by a uni-
form rule of "suspension only." A rule permitting renewal of the
entire limitation period upon the filing of a class action affords a
vindictive plaintiff the opportunity to harass his adversary by under-
mining his repose with respect to the unnamed parties, who, but for
the class action, may not be able to file individual actions. There is
no justification for allowing a procedural device, a Rule 23 federal
class action, to drastically alter a state statutory limitation period
incorporating limitation policies and to thereby thwart the pur-
poses of limitations periods.
Kathleen L. Cerveny
119 This issue was presented to the Fourth Circuit in O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15 (4th
Cir. 1980), in which the plaintiffs, suing as individuals and as guardians of their mother,
asserted the state statute of limitations which applied to the SEC Rule lOb-5 action should
be tolled because their mother was incompetent when the cause of action accrued. The
court applied the reasoning of Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454
(1975), that in borrowing a state period of limitation, "the chronological length of the limi-
tation period is interrelated with provisions regarding tolling, revival, and questions of ap-
plication." Johnson, 421 U.S. at 463-64. The state's tolling rules must also be borrowed.
The court recognized the applicability of tolling provisions provided by state law but held
that because the applicable Maryland blue sky statute did not provide for tolling on the
grounds of incompetency and it was not "empowered to engraft such a provision on the
Maryland Code." O'Hara, 625 F.2d at 19.
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